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Before The Americal (Part Two): Task Force 6814 and Saving the
British and French Empires in the Asia-Pacific, 1940–1942
Roger R. Thompson

Introducing Walter Walt

Walter W. Walt, Jr. (1916-2006) served in the Americal Division from the
moment it was created in New Caledonia in May 1942. Drafted in October
1941, and inducted into active service on 17 November, Walt was in training in
Virginia as Task Force 6814 was forming in mid-January 1942. A Californian,
he was assigned to the Massachusetts National Guard’s 101st Medical
Regiment, Company I. Task Force 6814 embarked from New York, with Walt
on the Santa Elena, in late January 1942, reached Australia in late February, and
landed at New Caledonia on 12 March 1942. The 182nd Infantry Regiment
(Massachusetts) and the 132nd Infantry Regiment (Illinois) were joined in
April by the 164th Infantry Regiment (North Dakota).

Disaster in the Asia-Pacific

The American public knew very little about the dramatic story of Task Force
6814. The task force mission, code-named POPPY, was classified “Secret”
for military and diplomatic reasons. On their way across the Pacific, the
men were told about life in Australia (on the Santa Elena troops read Private
Pillsbury Goes to Australia); they did not know their true mission: to occupy
and defend the French colony of New Caledonia from a Japanese invasion.
In early January 1942, the War Plans Division in the United States War
Department had “decided to occupy New Caledonia [with]… one triangular
division, heavily reinforced with artillery, and one pursuit squadron” and to
defend the island and the “natural resources [nickel and chrome] valuable to
Japan.” New Caledonia was also the last stop on the southern B-17 air ferry
route between California and Australia.

At both Pearl Harbor and the
Philippine Islands, Japan had
demonstrated the lethal and
destructive power of its carrierbased and ground-based planes. The
B-17s, the new long-range heavy
bombers the Japanese had destroyed
on the ground at Clark Field in the
Philippines shortly after the Pearl
Harbor attack, had reached Manila
via the northern air ferry route from
Hawaii, with stops at America’s
Midway, Wake, and Guam islands.
With the Japanese now controlling
Wake and Guam, the southern route
pioneered by the Pan American
Airways Clipper Service in 1940 was
the only way to ferry B-17s across
the Pacific.
The third reason for New
Caledonia’s importance: any attempt
to defeat Japan in southeast Asia
would require an advanced base in
Australia, the endpoint in a very long
line of communication from Hawaii
to South Pacific islands like New
Caledonia, lying about 1,000 miles
east of Australia. If the Japanese
occupied New Caledonia first, the
consequences would be disastrous

The world map published in the New York Times on 23 February 1942 to be used that evening during President Roosevelt’s radio
address to the nation on the progress of the war (The New York Times Company - Used under License).
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in the global war being waged against Germany, Italy,
and Japan by the new “United Nations” led by America,
Britain, the Soviet Union, and China and twenty-two
other countries that had signed a Joint Declaration at the
White House on New Year’s Day, 1942.
And so, on 12 January President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill met in the White House for the last
decision-making meeting of the secret Washington
Conference, code-named ARCADIA.
Some of the
discussion revolved around the critical shipping tradeoff for the moment: Russia or New Caledonia. Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill approved the Army’s plan
to send a division to New Caledonia, even though both
leaders wanted to focus on Europe and Hitler first.
These were momentous decisions made after much
preparatory discussion by the military staffs of the
United States and Britain. The United States Army’s
Chief of Staff General George Marshall, when the
White House discussion moved specifically to New
Caledonia, informed President Roosevelt, with support
from Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations, that
the occupation of New Caledonia was very important.
Marshall underscored the urgency of moving troops from
New York to New Caledonia: “to delay added to dangers
of the voyage.”
After extensive discussion about global shipping
to both the Western and Eastern hemispheres,
President Roosevelt, in the closing minutes of the
White House meeting, said simply: “We approve
General Marshall’s plan.”
Task Force 6814 must get whatever shipping
was available, now, and leave for the South Pacific,
immediately. General Eisenhower, whom Marshall had
called to Washington in mid-December to head the Pacific
Section of the War Plans Division, knew the situation was
so urgent that the ships could not be “combat-loaded”
before sailing--that would have to wait until Task Force
6814 arrived in Australia in mid-February.
For the troops leaving New York, there was room
and time for personal equipment only; their military
equipment and supplies would be shipped from the West
Coast and combat-loaded in Australia.
This was the most complicated convoy yet planned
by the Army, but it was accomplished with astonishing
speed. Two days after the Monday afternoon White
House decision, Walter Walt cabled his mother from
Virginia (Camp Lee): “Leaving here Friday [16 January]
for New York.” But first Walt travelled all the way to
Camp Edwards on Cape Cod where he joined Company
I of the 101st Medical Regiment. These men, and others
from Massachusetts National Guard units, left Cape Cod
for New York Monday evening (19 January). Shortly
before midnight the next day, just after boarding the Grace
Lines’ Santa Elena at the New York Port of Embarkation,
Walt wrote the first line of his first trans-Pacific diaryletter: “Dear Mom: Well. Here starts adventure.”
General Marshall had told President Roosevelt these
troops would arrive in Australia (code-named X) by 14
February. It would take an extra ten days before Walter
Walt and his shipmates, five weeks after boarding the
Santa Elena at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, would finally
glimpse Melbourne Harbor. By then, as it turned out, the

situation in the Asia-Pacific had grown very, very bleak
for the United Nations. Radio Tokyo was terrorizing
Australians, Japan’s naval air forces had bombed Port
Darwin, the last stop on the southern B-17 air ferry route
to the Philippines, on Australia’s northwestern coast, to
devastating effect on 19 February. In Singapore, on 15
February, thousands of Allied troops had surrendered to
the Japanese soldiers whose stunning sweep down the
Malaya Peninsula had started as Japanese naval pilots
launch their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
A week after the British had surrendered their naval
fortress at Singapore, Roosevelt ordered General Douglas
MacArthur to leave the Philippines and the shattered
air-arm of American power in the Pacific, for Australia.
General Marshall, returning to his office after a Sunday
evening meeting with the President at the White House
to confirm this decision, made sure the order was sent out
immediately. America’s fortress in the Philippines, as the
New York Times had headlined in its 19 November 1941
issue, was vanquished. The Commander in Chief’s “Eyes
Only” radiogram was delivered in person to MacArthur
at 12:30 A.M. (Washington D.C. time) on 23 February
1942. It would be a long, long day for America and the
United Nations.

President Roosevelt Prepares America
for War in the Asia-Pacific

For weeks, Roosevelt’s press aides had been preparing
Americans for the President’s first nationwide radio
address since the one he delivered shortly after Pearl
Harbor. Day-by-day, as the President worked over
drafts, the news from the Asia-Pacific became more and
more grim.
Most of America tuned in at 10:00 P.M. Eastern War
Time on 23 February 1942 as Task Force 6814 was secretly
nearing Melbourne. The President’s press aides had
promised an important address on the progress of the
war. At the President’s request, millions of Americans
had purchased or located world maps (newspapers were
encouraged to publish maps in the days leading up to
the address) so they could follow on their maps as he
explained the geo-political complexities and necessities
of this new global war.
He started with China, now almost completely
isolated from the United Nations, and by the end of his
address he had covered the world. In his concluding
words, President Roosevelt assured Americans that their
men were already fighting the Japanese in the Pacific.
But he did not share what he knew: a few days earlier
Task Force 6814’s fast-carrier escort USS Lexington,
while preparing to launch a diversionary raid on Japan’s
positions at Rabaul in New Britain, was discovered by the
Japanese. The Lexington’s heroic naval aviators repelled
a fierce attack by waves of Japanese bombers. (Two days
later, U.S. Army B-17s under naval command, flying out
of northeastern Australia, attacked Rabaul.)
The Japanese were well-prepared for both the
Lexington’s raid and the President’s propaganda war.
Roosevelt’s speech would be broadcast or published
around the world in many languages. He probably knew
that Radio Tokyo had already been broadcasting counter17
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propaganda. But he did not know this: just as he was being introduced to a
huge radio audience, a Japanese submarine off the coast of southern California
began firing about twenty shells at an oil refinery near Goleta, just west of Santa
Barbara. Japan’s first attack on the U.S. mainland, not the President’s address
to the nation and the world, was the top banner headline--“Submarine Shells
California Oil Plant”--and the lead story, in Tuesday morning’s New York
Times. The second story, also in the headlines, was the complete transcript of
the President’s address, with a photo of the President pointing to the middle
of the Pacific on his world map. And on a second world map, published on
the page with the rest of the address, the place named “New Caledonia” was
as wide as the continent of Australia.

Localizing the Global Conflict: War Comes to New Caledonia

Walter Walt heard the President’s broadcast live as the Santa Elena
neared Melbourne.
He could not quite figure out the implications for him and the men of the
101st Medical Regiment. Walt wrote: “Just finished listening to the President
speak. Still am trying to figure out what he said. He’s good at speaking
and really not giving out a whole lot of information.” But for the starving,
beleaguered American soldiers listening on the Bataan Peninsula jutting into
Manila Bay, the meaning was clear: There would be no reinforcements for
the Philippines. Little did these men know that twenty-four hours earlier,
President Roosevelt had ordered their commander to leave them to their
fate as he journeyed to Australia. At least they were no longer under “No
surrender” orders; Small solace.
But the Australians who saw Task Force 6814 arriving at Melbourne a
few days later might have assumed, given the dark news of recent days that
help had finally arrived. Walter Walt’s unit was sent to the mining town of
Ballarat, where some of them, including Walt and his commanding officer,
Dr. Dale Friend, were hosted by two eminent families in their homes on
Ballarat’s grand Sturt Street. While the visit was short, the connections made
could last a lifetime. Walt’s host, Charles Gribble, even had had enough time
to entertain Walt at the Old Colonists Club and sponsor him for a month’s
honorary club membership. But Walt, Friend, and the rest of the 101st
Medical Regiment were soon back in Melbourne, where Task Force 6814’s
convoy was now “combat-loaded.”
This time the regiment was assigned to the largest of the seven ships in
the convoy, the Ericsson. Before the war, this was one of the finest ships of the
Swedish-American Line, christened the Kungsholm. Even as they boarded the
Ericsson in Melbourne, neither Walt nor his friends were certain where they
were going. In his last diary-letter (11 March 1942) Walt wrote: “We’re on our
way to, where, nobody knows. There are all sorts of rumors as to where we’ll
land this time; Looks very much like we’re leaving Australia. Perhaps it will
be New Caladonia [sic]. We’ll have to learn French, I guess.” Dr. Friend, Walt’s
commanding officer, had written in his journal on 8 March: “I have already

Task Force 6814 convoy arriving in Noumea Harbor, New Caledonia on 12 March
1942 (U.S. Army photo).
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considered the fall of New Caledonia
(where we are apparently scheduled
for (a la the Rumor).” In a train of
ominous .speculation, he thought
New Caledonia could “become
hopeless as it was at Singapore.”

Occupying New Caledonia:
The French Connection(s)

The Ericsson, which Walter Walt,
perhaps mindful of the censorship
rules, mimeographed on the ship’s
menu stock, only referred to as
once being a “luxurious” SwedishAmerican Line ship, was “delayed
a couple of days” because it “had
a little engine trouble” and lagged
behind the other six ships carrying
Task Force 6814 that would reach
Noumea Harbor on 12 March 1942.
A photograph of the formidable
task force ships suggests why New
Caledonians were astonished at what
they saw across the harbor. The
commanding U.S. Army general,
Alexander Patch, had arrived by
seaplane only a week before. He
brought the first specific word to
General Charles de Gaulle’s handpicked High Commissioner of France
in the Pacific, Admiral Georges
Thierry d’Argenlieu, about the
military operation underway. The
High Commissioner had been asking
for information since January, but
the United States so distrusted the
ability of de Gaulle and the French
National Committee’s to keep this
secret-secret, that the Free French
in London were kept in the dark.
Information about General Patch’s
Task Force 6814 was so protected
that the Army refused to inform the
High Commissioner by radiogram.
D’Argenlieu found out, finally, in
his first face-to-face meeting with
General Patch on 5 March 1942.
A few days earlier the New York
Times broke the story, but this was
a story with almost no information:
“U.S. Aids Defense of New
Caledonia.” But the United States,
still courting Vichy French authorities
in France, sought to distance itself
from this no-news news story. The
source of this story was Admiral
d’Argenlieu, who made public from
New Caledonia the agreement the
State Department had just reached in
Washington, D.C., with de Gaulle’s

Free French National Committee.
The State Department also kept tight control of
military information. De Gaulle and D’Argenlieu were
not given any information about Patch and his Task
Force 6814, although Patch was allowed, face-to-face, to
tell D’Argenlieu about the United States forces that had
arrived at the French Tahiti island of Bora Bora two weeks
earlier on 18 February to garrison the island and maintain
a fuel depot.
The announcement first made in New Caledonia
implied, according to the New York Times report, that
elsewhere in the Pacific America might instead recognize,
as it had in Indochina, Vichy French sovereignty. The
accompanying map indicated that the New York Times
was only sure about New Caledonia being under Free
French control. The Times presumed, incorrectly, that
U.S. troops were already on the island; they were still in
Australia. And even that was still classified.
Before boarding their Task Force 6814 ships a second
time, some men had just enough time to send one last
telegram to loved ones back home. Even these personal
communications maintained the veil of secrecy. The
telegraph company could not indicate the location of the
sending office. Walter Walt’s telegram (2 March 1942)
to his mother was marked: ”Sans origine.” He cabled
cryptically: “Feeling fine. Everything OK. Don’t be
anxious.” An indication of the degree of War Department
concern about the secrecy of the mission, which was
rooted in the danger the men faced, was the successful
War Department intervention to suppress the publication
in a major Chicago newspaper of a telegram from the
commanding officer of Illinois National Guard troops
reporting that his 2,500 men were in Australia.
Six of the seven-ship convoy left Melbourne on
6 March 1942 and continued on to New Caledonia.
Admiral Chester Nimitz, commanding America’s Pacific
Fleet from his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, ordered
the USS Yorktown, done escorting the second secret
task force to Bora Bora, to join the Lexington. Both fastcarrier groups covered Task Force 6814 on its final days
at sea. On 12 March 1942, the convoy (less the Ericsson,
which arrived 14 March) pulled into Noumea Harbor
as the carriers remained on station to the north to cover
the hectic unloading operation for the next few days.
Finally, on 16 March, the carrier task forces separated
and pulled away. Nimitz ordered the Lexington back
to Pearl Harbor; the Yorktown remained on patrol in
the South Pacific, operating out of New Caledonia’s
Noumea Harbor. Thirteen weeks after Pearl Harbor,
the United States Army began to establish defensive
positions throughout the island, most importantly at the
new Australian-built airfield just north of Noumea. The
American occupation of New Caledonia, first called for
in early January, had begun.

Occupying New Caledonia:
The Japanese Threat

March was also a momentous month in Washington,
D.C. In addition to a high-level re-organization of Army
administration, the United States and Britain agreed to a

broad division of responsibilities for the global war, with
the United States taking the lead in the Pacific. It was
in this context, as Admiral King was preparing for staff
discussions, that he sent a memo to General Marshall
asking for the latest statistics about the Army’s presence
in the “Pacific Area.” General Marshall responded the
same day. This quick exchange of memos on 17 March
1942--the hundredth day of the war--took place just after
the Army-Navy cooperation that had delivered Task
Force 6814 safely to New Caledonia.
Marshall’s statistics underscored just how small
America’s forces were in the face of extensive Japanese
troop conquests throughout their “Southern Resource”
zone. Marshall told King the following about these main
Army deployments (troops/combat planes) in Australia
and the South Pacific:
Australia: 31,691/14 heavy bombers operational
New Caledonia:
17,276/25 pursuit planes
Efate (New Hebrides): 450/0
With Task Force 6814 now preparing to defend New
Caledonia, its capital at Noumea became the nerve center
for the shrinking United Nations presence in the South
Pacific, now down to New Caledonia, Australia, New
Zealand, and a few other Pacific islands. (Even as Task
Force 6814 was moving ashore and across New Caledonia,
RCA established a direct radio-telegraph circuit between
New Caledonia and the United States.)
The Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and Singapore,
British Burma and soon its famous Burma Road to China-all of these colonies and their rich natural resources-were now in the hands of the Japanese. China faced
a total blockade of its sea and land routes. And New
Caledonia, only two-hundred-fifty miles long and thirty
miles wide, was at the center of the newly-formed
Australia-New Zealand Area Command (ANZAC). The
coalition of United Nations military forces in Southeast
Asia established on 15 January 1942, the day after the end
of the First Washington Conference, had not lasted even
two months. Japan appeared invincible.
It would take twenty months for New Caledonia and
other advanced bases to be built up enough to launch the
American counter-offensive from the South Pacific that
started with the November 1943 invasion of the Gilbert
Islands, the Central Pacific islands taken from Britain in
December 1941, just days after the attacks on Malaya,
Hawaii, and the Philippines.
With his Task Force 6814 safely disembarked and
setting up positions throughout New Caledonia, General
Patch could now step back and look at the strategic and
tactical challenges before him. Could his troops on New
Caledonia withstand a Japanese attack? Looking at the
1,600 miles between the airfields at his Noumea and
Japan’s Rabaul in New Britain, General Patch immediately
dispatched 450 troops about 300 miles north to defend
Efate and start building an airfield in the southern New
Hebrides. Five weeks later, on 4 May 1942, the Japanese
countered and occupied Tulagi.
This was no surprise. The Japanese had bombed
this British administrative center at the southern edge
of their Solomon Islands colony in early January 1942.
19
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Of the Westerners, only a few missionaries had refused
to evacuate to safer islands in the South Pacific; a small
detachment of the Australian military had pulled out on
1 May. As the Americans solidified their positions on
Efate, 750 miles to the southeast in the New Hebrides,
the Japanese quickly built a seaplane base at Tulagi.
America’s Efate airfield was scheduled, as General
Marshall had told Admiral King in his 17 March memo,
for completion by mid-June.
By April, Japan had consolidated its holdings
throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese and
American forces drew closer to one another –--first 1,600
miles (Rabaul-Noumea), then 750 miles (Tulagi-Efate)-on small islands in the South Pacific as their powerful
navies continued to parry blows across the vastness of
the Pacific. The Tulagi operation was part of a major
Japanese offensive ordered on 29 January 1942 to extend
Japan’s reach from Rabaul--taken on 23 January as Task
Force 6814 was leaving New York--to the Australian-held
Port Moresby, just southwest of Rabaul.
The May invasion of Port Moresby was blocked by
the same two fast-carrier task forces that had protected
Task Force 6814 in March. The Lexington, the carrier
that had also protected Task Force 6814 in February as it
approached Melbourne, was lost in this battle, the Battle
of the Coral Sea. The Imperial General Headquarters in
Tokyo now ordered its forces to take to Midway Island in
the Central Pacific, having already informed its forces in
the South Pacific on 28 April to delay until June the second
attempt to occupy Port Moresby and that operation’s
second phase, taking New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. Dr.
Friend had worried about the “fall” of New Caledonia in
March. Had he enough time to prepare and train his men
if the attack finally came in the months to come?

Occupying New Caledonia: The French Threat

Admiral Nimitz, who ordered the battered Yorktown
back to Pearl Harbor for repairs, had been convinced
that Japan’s next strike would be at Midway Island,
west of Hawaii, in early June. The second attempt for
a Port Moresby invasion had been delayed to June as
a consequence of the Doolittle raid, which had struck
Tokyo on 18 April with B-25s launched in an audacious
one-way raid from the USS Hornet in the North Pacific.
Should Midway be in Japanese hands, the risk of another
Tokyo raid would be much less.
Nimitz was convinced of the Japanese plans, in part
because of the trust he put in estimates made by the
Navy’s communications intelligence operation in Hawaii.
But others, including Admiral King in Washington, D.C.,
and General MacArthur in Australia, interpreted the
same evidence to suggest the next strike would come
somewhere in the South Pacific, with targets ranging from
Port Moresby, to New Caledonia, to Australia. General
MacArthur, in particular, had been focused on this scenario
since April (MacArthur had arrived in Melbourne, where
he established his command headquarters, on 21 March
1942.) He had warned General Patch twice in late April
to be prepared for a Japanese invasion.
Patch had just brought his Task Force 6814 to strength
20
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Right to Left: Admiral Robert Ghormley, Commander of South
Pacific Force; Major General Alexander Patch Commander of
Task Force 6814 and Ghormley’s Chief of Staff, Admiral Daniel
Callaghan, coming ashore 19 May, 1942 at Noumea, New
Caledonia, for inspection and consultation (U.S. Army Photo).

in mid-April with the arrival of the 164th Infantry
Regiment, the North Dakota National Guard unit that
had sailed on 18 March for Australia from San Francisco
on the luxury liner-turned-troopship President Coolidge.
On 18 April 1942--the day Doolittle and his airmen
raided Tokyo--the North Dakotans joined the 132nd
infantry Regiment (Illinois) and the 182nd Infantry
Regiment (Massachusetts).
Patch, finally, had the
“heavily reinforced triangular infantry division” the War
Plans Division had specified for New Caledonia in early
January during the first Washington Conference.
Task Force 6814 reached full strength not a minute too
soon. Not only did Patch need troops for defense of the
island, he also needed them for maintaining local order.
The newly-arrived 164th was assigned to defend the
section in and around Noumea. One can only imagine
their bewilderment when these men from North Dakota
were soon called upon to maintain order in the midst
of what can only be called a local insurrection. In the
midst of this crisis the War Department, for the first
time, announced on 25 April, in a terse forty-six-word
communiqué that included these words: “American
troops have arrived at the island of New Caledonia.”
The Free French celebrated; the French government at
Vichy issued a communiqué decrying the “French rebels
against the fatherland [who] took over New Caledonia
in September 1940… [T]his fact does not authorize the
Americans to land troops there.”
Three days later, in his first national radio address since
his 23 February 1942 “Map Chat,” President Roosevelt
began to signal a policy shift that, eventually, opened
doors for de Gaulle and his struggle for Free French
sovereignty in New Caledonia and around the world.
Responding to a recent tilt toward Germany by the Vichy
French, in his radio address Roosevelt suggested that
most French men and women supported the cause of
the United Nations. These were not, in his mind, “rebels
against the fatherland.” Back in New Caledonia these
“rebels,” according to the Vichy French, the mostly rural
New Caledonians who had made it possible for de Gaulle

to claim he had “rallied” New Caledonia to his cause in
September 1940, now rose up to protest the removal from
power of the popular Governor Sautot who had taken up
their Free French cause, as he had earlier in the AngloFrench co-dominion New Hebrides, in 1940.
Eighteen months later Sautot’s willingness to
cooperate with General Patch, as he had cooperated
with the Australians in 1940, infuriated de Gaulle’s
High Commissioner Admiral D’Argenlieu, who had
taken up his post in November 1941. D’Argenlieu was
unhappy with all aspects of the American occupation
that unfolded beginning in March 1942. With de
Gaulle’s approval, D’Argenlieu kidnapped Sautot,
arrested the pro-American local council, and sent them
all away from New Caledonia in exile. As civil unrest
simmered toward a full boil, Patch wrote four urgent
radiograms in three days (6-8 May) about the political
situation in New Caledonia.
On 8 May, in one of the most momentous days in the
history of Task Force 6814, an extraordinary sequence
of communications and decisions connected Noumea
with Hawaii, Washington, D.C., Hyde Park, and
London. The White House, the War Department, the
Navy Department, the State Department, and American
military and diplomatic representatives in London
collaborated to support General Patch and bring to heel
General de Gaulle, the French National Committee, and
Admiral d’Argenlieu in New Caledonia. Patch soon had
permission from Washington, D.C., to declare martial law,
if necessary. De Gaulle and d’Argenlieu backed down,
and Patch could return to his preparations for a possible
Japanese invasion.

Tokyo Delays; Noumea Plans: Task Force 6814
Takes Its Place in the Global War

Contrary to MacArthur’s April warnings, the Japanese
target in early May was not New Caledonia. Instead, as
we have seen, it was Port Moresby. Thwarted once, it was
likely Japan would try again; But when? The gravity of
the situation was underscored by the decision to halt at
New Caledonia a squadron of eight B-17s just beginning,
in mid-May, its long southern air ferry flight to Australia.
In a secret “Eyes Only” radiogram of 14 May 1942,
General Marshall told General MacArthur of the
developing Japanese threats in the Pacific. Marshall
also knew, as General Eisenhower had told him the
day before, that supply chiefs were being told to make
sure there were enough bombs and gasoline for New
Caledonia and nearby Fiji, which would get its own
provisional squadron of B-17s. Should Japan attack Port
Moresby again, heavy bombers could counter-attack
from Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji. Moreover, these
B-17s in the South Pacific could protect Admiral Halsey’s
USS Enterprise and USS Hornet now on patrol east of
the New Hebrides. But days later, so sure was Admiral
Nimitz that Midway, not Port Moresby, was Japan’s next
target, that on 16 May 1942 he recalled to Hawaii his last
remaining fast-carrier task force in the South Pacific,
Admiral Halsey’s Enterprise and Hornet.
Even as it prepared for the Midway operation in the

Central Pacific, Tokyo ordered its South Pacific forces to
be prepared to attack New Caledonia in mid-June. And
Washington, D.C., too, continued to pay attention to New
Caledonia. General Patch had met the twin crises of
late April and early May: a threat of a Japanese invasion
and Free French factionalism. His hand has been
strengthened, and the fact of the American occupation of
New Caledonia could now be de-classified.
Patch later had discussions in May with visiting staff
officers from the War Department’s Operation Plans
Division (the just re-named War Plans Division). Patch had
much to report and discuss, including ideas for a regular
combat infantry division. But much attention, especially in
the Navy Department in the first days after the Battle of the
Coral Sea, was focused on Hawaii and Midway.
On 8 May, General Marshall sent a secret radiogram
to General Patch telling him that he now reported to
Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii (on 7 May--the day he lost the
Lexington in the Battle of the Coral Sea--Nimitz assumed
operational command of all Army units in the “Pacific
Area”). On the same day Marshall wrote to Patch, he
brought Admiral King up-to-speed on recent events
in the South Pacific. King had just designated Admiral
Robert Ghormley the first Commander of South Pacific
Force. After a week of discussions at Pearl Harbor,
Ghormley added Rear Admiral John McCain to his team
as Commander Aircraft South Pacific Area. (McCain
would soon locate his flagship in Noumea Harbor.)
Ghormley then began a tour of inspection and
consultation. By 19 May 1942 he had reached New
Caledonia. General Patch and his visitors walked
away from a Navy launch under gorgeous skies in the
South Pacific for a meeting in Noumea in which there
was much to discuss. It is probable that General Patch
shared with Admiral Ghormley an unprecedented
idea: designating Task Force 6814 as a regular “combat
infantry division.” Never in the history of the United
States Army had an infantry division ever been formed
and trained on foreign soil, an undertaking that would
take a year in the continental United States. But these
were extraordinary times.
General Patch would soon bid farewell to his Navy
visitors; he would see them again. Now it was time
to prepare for Japan’s planned June invasion of New
Caledonia, which some intelligence analysts thought
could come early in the month. With Admiral Halsey’s
Enterprise and Hornet steaming toward Pearl Harbor
under Admiral Nimitz’s 16 May 1942 order, General
Patch’s Task Force 6814 was now almost all alone in the
South Pacific.
The author, Roger Thompson, enlisted in the U.S.
Air Force (1970-1974) and served a tour of duty in
northern Thailand in 1973. He teaches Chinese history
and “WWII: The Pacific War” at Western Washington
University. He would like to thank Walter Walt’s son
Christopher, and his daughter Melissa, for permission
to use their father’s World War II diary-letters, photos,
and ephemera in this project.
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